ing, for someone who has no acquaintance with the literature. Opposing positions are set out accurately and simply, and their merits fairly assessed based on the internal logic of the puzzle. It is, in my view, a model of how to think and teach philosophically. Olin takes particular pains to enable the reader to appreciate the scope of the issues that lie at the heart of paradoxes. We see how, for example, the lottery paradox challenges our understanding of justifying evidence, even to the point of calling into question a weak principle of deductive closure: If S is justified on the evidence in believing each of a set of statements, these statements jointly entail Q, and S recognizes this entailment, then S is justified on the evidence in believing Q. Those unacquainted with the paradoxes will be enthralled; those already acquainted, even if they have published on them, may find much that is new and gripping.
Is there room to quarrel? Of course. The fallibility argument, a version of the preface paradox, points out that I am justified in believing, on the basis of finding errors in past justified beliefs, that some of my justified beliefs are false. Since this meta-belief is one of my justified beliefs, the total set of my beliefs is inconsistent. (One of them has to be false.) Thus, paradoxically, there is rational basis for having inconsistent beliefs. Olin takes issue with this 'radical' view. Her problem is that the induction from past error is illegitimate. Suppose I arrive at my beliefs by reading tea-leaves. That method has led to error, yet the inference that new beliefs so formed are likely to be in error is, on her view, a mistake. Why? Because the set of beliefs that are the negations of the former beliefs would not be less likely to be in error. True enough, but that is because the connection between tealeaf reading and truth is random. Given that, the likelihood of error is great in either set, but this fact in no way undermines the original inference.
But the places where I do not find her arguments plausible, even compelling, are few. Paradox is a solid, original contribution to philosophy. The late John O'Manique's passionate final book, The Origins of Justice, is an extended defence of a set of hypotheses concerning the evolutionary emergence of human consciousness and how morality may have evolved out of human developmental drives. This is treacherous territory: the history of evolutionary perspectives on ethics is fraught with failed attempts to avoid illicit breaches of the fact/value distinction.
O'Manique bases his thesis on what he deems to be a more plausible and balanced characterization of human nature than the one underlying mainstream Western moral thought, which he describes as hopelessly androcentric and Hobbesian in its characterization of human life as 'solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short.' O'Manique's general worry here is a fair one, and one that many others (especially feminist scholars) have dealt with at length. However, O'Manique's specific characterization of Western ethical theory borders on caricature. Even if Hobbes saw himself as describing how life really is (and Hobbes explicitly denies this), modern Hobbesians are certainly not committed to this view much less are the general run of Western philosophers so committed. The Hobbesian 'state of nature' is a thought experiment designed to illustrate the role a normative system plays in making life better. It assumes that human nature is sufficiently egoistic (nasty) to cause problems (brutish, short lives), problems theorists think their normative frameworks can ameliorate. O'Manique's straw-man argument against the Western tradition constitutes a three-chapter-long distraction. It neither significantly advances O'Manique's own argument, nor sufficiently considers the intentions of the theorists he criticizes.
O'Manique likewise overstates his case when he accuses the entire Western tradition of focusing on rationality to the exclusion of emotion; he thereby ignores the enormous influence of philosophers like David Hume, who famously held that reason 'is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions.' Further, O'Manique overlooks the fact that, for most theorists, the rationality of various moral systems lies not in the ratiocinative histories of those systems, but rather in the fact that they are rationally defensible. Surely the claim that a moral system is rationally defensible in no way denigrates the significance of emotion in our moral lives.
Having thus (mis)characterized mainstream moral philosophy, O'Manique proceeds to ask what the prehistorical development of human selfconsciousness and normative frameworks might have looked like, given his 'alternative' assumption that human nature features at least as much altruism as egoism, and that humans are fundamentally 'relational,' rather than isolated. He concludes that if we are (or if our early ancestors were) primarily driven by altruism and the need for community, morality would have evolved not, as is typically assumed, as a way of limiting conflict, but as an expression of our altruistic drives. And, O'Manique tells us, since we're here now, it follows that our ancestors must have had the relevant survival-enhancing, pro-social attitudes. A just person, then, simply is one who seeks to support the 'developmental' needs of others. But notice that although O'Manique purports to sketch how humanity came to have a notion of justice, he concludes by telling us what it is to be just, and thus slides from the plainly descriptive to the implicitly normative.
Even more worrisome than O'Manique's blurring of the fact/value distinction, or his mischaracterization of Western ethics, is the book's neglect of significant literatures. O'Manique hypothesizes about the psyches of early hominids, yet makes no reference to the literature on evolutionary psychology, and too little reference to relevant debates in philosophy of mind and cognitive science. Similarly, O'Manique's discussion of the evolution of rights makes only passing reference to the extensive rights literature. Granted, O'Manique's project synthesizes an enormous range of topics, and such an effort warrants some charity if the result is sufficiently productive or thought-provoking.
I suspect there is an audience for this book, though perhaps not an overly academic one. The faith in human decency it evinces is indeed heartening. One cannot help but be charmed by the author's insistence upon our innate capacity for goodness. But many readers will be annoyed by the logically unsupportable slide from descriptive hypothesis to implicit normative claims. And I suspect both philosophers and evolutionary biologists will be frustrated by O'Manique's just-so story about the evolutionary emergence of justice. The rising costs of providing medical services and the increasing ratio of the old to the young lead some to claim that current medical systems are unsustainable; therefore, new methods for allocating medical care are needed. Philosophers such as Callahan and Hardwig advocate age-based rationing. Hardwig goes so far as to claim that the aged have a duty to die at around eighty. Overall joins philosophers opposed to this approach to distributive justice. She is a fierce opponent of apologism (age-based rationing) and an ardent advocate of prolongevitism (which promotes the extension of lives). Many of her conclusions are so moderate, indeed so commonsensical, as to seem almost anodyne compared to those of extremists in the debate. Overall writes in a clear, accessible style, although she takes over from the literature a plethora of rebarbative 'isms,' e.g., apologism and prolongevitism, as well as the usual suspects, sexism, racism, ageism, ableism. ... She personalizes the discussion with references to her own situation: her 'lifelong preoccupation with the inevitability of death and a sense of its injustice,' as well as references to the deaths of her father and grandmother. But she buttresses her case with arguments, reasons, and evidence usually to good effect.
Much of the book is devoted to perennial philosophical questions that provide a background to the issues of distributive justice: (1) What constitutes a good life? (2) Is there a 'natural' limit to human life? (3) Is a long life better than a short one? (4) Given the assumption that there is no form of life after death, would an earthly form of immortality be desirable?
